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To the credit of his government, some of the reforms that 
are highly popular and face weak opposition have already 
been carried out. For instance, the modest relaxation of 
the draconian one-child policy has taken place. All of 
China’s provinces have announced their timelines for al-
lowing couples to have a second child if one of them is a 
single child. In a symbolic move of deregulation, China’s 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has lifted its 
ban on new stock market listings and several private com-
panies were able to float their shares.
 However, many of the more critical reforms still await. 
Although these reforms will affect different sectors, they 
share some common characteristics, such as the need for 
legislative action, detailed formulation, additional fiscal 
spending by the Central Government, and strong politi-
cal opposition. Xi and his colleagues will need to over-
come these obstacles soon, ideally during the upcoming 
National People’s Congress (NPC) in mid-March, in order 
to maintain the momentum for reform.
Three Major Reforms to Watch
Of the reforms that will potentially have a significant po-
sitive impact on improving the livelihood of hundreds of 
millions of rural residents, the proposal to allow farmers 
to realize some cash income from their rights in leased 
farm land has become the litmus test of whether Xi’s lead-
ership team can actually deliver on his promised reforms. 
Indeed, if carried out, land reform would be the most radi-
cal rural change since the dismantling of collective agri-
culture thirty years ago. However, opposition runs strong 
Emerging signs of economic difficulties have greatly compounded the tasks 
facing new Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the year of horse. After his gov-
ernment rolled out a surprisingly ambitious blueprint for systemic economic 
reform in November last year, Xi, the general secretary of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP), now finds his agenda complicated by the urgent need 
to stabilize the overleveraged financial sector while taking the first steps to 
implement enough of his promised reforms to gain credibility.
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whether it succeeds in passing legislation related to land 
reform in the NPC’s upcoming annual session.
 Implementing hukou reform would be another test of 
Xi’s ability to push his agenda forward. The Chinese huk-
ou system, which effectively denies rural residents equal 
citizenship rights and access to publicly funded social 
services in urban areas (such as education and health in-
surance), is an obstacle to labor and social mobility. It is 
also a major cause of rural-urban disparities. 
 Reforming the hukou system can deliver many ben-
efits. In the short-term, it will effectively raise the income 
of rural migrants working in the cities (by giving them 
access to free or subsidized social services). In the long 
run, the reform will contribute to a reduction in inequal-
ity and a consumption-based economy.
in the Chinese bureaucracy. Conservatives see a major 
concession on full state ownership and control of land 
as a dangerous move that undermines the power of the 
state. Local government officials worry that, by granting 
more property rights to farmers, they would lose their 
ability to requisition land for lucrative commercial devel-
opment and lose considerable revenues in the future. 
 Technically, this complex reform requires amending 
the constitution and passing relevant laws so that farm-
ers’ newly gained rights will be legally protected and pro-
cedures can be developed to mortgage farmers’ land leas-
ing rights. Senior Chinese leaders have remained silent 
on the issue of land reform since last November (a tell-
tale sign that the proposed reform is stalled). One indica-
tor of the Xi government’s commitment to this reform is 
Figure 1: Key Reform Measures and Their Prospects
Proposed Reform Content Status Outlook
Land Reform Giving farmers the ability to mort-
gage their land leases to obtain 
loans
Disagreements among various gov-
ernment departments. No specific 
measures announced.
Requires constitutional amend-
ments and major legislative actions. 
No progress anticipated in the near 
term.
Hukou Reform Giving 200 million rural migrants 
working in cities free access to 
public services
About 70 million will receive their 
urban residency rights, but no solu-
tion reached on funding expanded 
public services 
Requires long-term fiscal reform 
to finance local governments’ new 
expenditures. Uncertain near-term 
prospects
Deregulation Abolishing most government 
approval of economic activities 
through “negative lists.”
No specific actions yet. Intense 
discussion inside the government 
on the content of “negative lists.”
Various regions may produce differ-
ent negative lists. Uncertain as to 
the enforcement process.
Relaxing One-Child 
Policy
Allowing couples a second child if 
one of them is a single-child
Full implementation in 2014 2 million more children are likely to 
be born each year.
Source: Minxin Pei
3 Evidently, such deregulation would free up enormous 
pent-up entrepreneurial energy in Chinese society. How-
ever, so far nothing of note has occurred on the deregula-
tion front. The opposition from the Chinese bureaucracy 
is expected to be fierce because deregulation will reduce 
the power of many officials, who have traditionally used 
their approval authority to extract bribes. Another poten-
tial obstacle to deregulation is enforcement. Private entre-
preneurs should be able to seek judicial relief when they 
encounter obstructionist bureaucrats who illegally inter-
fere in their commercial activities. To instill confidence 
in Chinese private entrepreneurs, Xi and his colleagues 
must issue “negative lists” in most sectors soon and spec-
ify procedures that can help private entrepreneurs fight 
the bureaucracy.
Unholy Trinity: Financial Stability, 
Growth, and Reform
If one thinks these structural reforms are hard enough, 
they are, in all likelihood, not the most pressing concerns 
on the minds of top Chinese leaders. Reality has an un-
pleasant habit of intruding on even the best-laid plans. In 
the Chinese case, Xi has the bad of luck of attempting the 
most challenging reforms when the most critical danger 
facing the Chinese economy is not long-term stagnation 
but a near-term financial crisis.
 Indeed, worries that China could experience a finan-
cial sector meltdown have preoccupied the global business 
community. Such concerns have arisen mainly because 
of rapid credit growth in China since 2008. In response 
to the global financial crisis, the Chinese government 
unleashed a tidal wave of bank loans to support growth. 
Altogether, roughly $15 trillion in bank loans (nearly 200 
percent of GDP) have been extended during this period. 
On average, loan growth averaged nearly 20 percent a 
year, more than double the GDP growth, in the last five 
years. Consequently, total debt to GDP now is estimated to 
be between 210–230 percent. Although the overall debt 
 The Chinese government has announced a three-step 
strategy to allow roughly 200 million migrants from ru-
ral areas to obtain urban residency rights in the coming 
years. According to this plan, rural migrants now work-
ing in towns and small cities (with population of 500,000 
and under) will be granted full residency rights immedi-
ately. Urban residency rights will gradually be given to 
those living in mid-sized cities (with population between 
half a million to two million). Migrants in large cities 
(population over two million) will gain similar rights only 
after the impact of such reform is carefully studied.
 Although this reform is more modest than it sounds, 
taking even the initial step could enable 70–80 million 
rural migrants now working in towns and small cities 
to receive valuable public services. The uncertainty at 
the moment comes from two sources. First, most local 
governments have not announced specific implementa-
tion rules or timetables for carrying out the first step. 
Second, the central government has not committed itself 
to paying for the costs of the reform (perhaps that is why 
few local governments have announced a timetable for 
reform). Since local governments, which have a narrow 
tax base (they collect only 40 percent of the taxes but are 
responsible for 80 percent of the total public spending) 
have no means to fund the additional services, Beijing 
will need to increase fiscal transfers to motivate local 
governments to implement the hukou reform as quickly 
as possible.
 The third test of the Xi government’s ability to force 
through change is deregulation. The CCP’s reform plan 
set forth a bold plan for radical deregulation that, if imple-
mented, would eliminate many, if not most, unnecessary 
bureaucratic approvals currently needed for starting 
businesses or making investments. One key provision of 
the deregulation reform is the idea of a “negative list” – a 
public list of commercial activities explicitly prohibited 
by the government. Activities not on the list will require 
no official approval. 
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The history of financial crisis shows that no country 
has avoided a banking crisis if credit grows at the pace 
recorded in China since 2008. The other salient feature 
is the poor repayment ability of the two largest groups 
of borrowers in China – local governments and Chinese 
companies. The narrow tax base of local governments 
generates little cash flow to service their debt. To make 
matters worse, much of the new debt borrowed by Chi-
nese local governments appears to have gone into pro-
jects with dubious future returns (such as superfluous 
prestige infrastructure projects). 
 Among Chinese corporate borrowers, SOEs have en-
gaged in reckless expansion, building new plants, spec-
ulating in real estate, and acquiring overseas assets at 
sky-high prices. Such expansion has resulted in excess 
level in China is lower than in developed economies, it is 
the highest among emerging market economies. 
 What makes the Chinese situation unique and more 
worrisome is the breakdown of the debt. Sovereign debt 
level is relatively low, with explicit sovereign debt at 25 
percent of GDP. Private consumer debt is similarly low, at 
around 20 percent of GDP. At the same time, local govern-
ments have seen their debt rise to about 20–25 percent of 
GDP. Chinese companies, both State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and private companies, have also piled up debt 
comparable to 145–160 percent of GDP (in most devel-
oping countries, corporate debt average between 40–70 
percent of GDP).
 Two facets of China’s financial sector raise red flags 
about its stability. One is the rapidity of debt growth. 
Figure 2: Loans granted by banks in China from 2003 to 2012 
in relation to GDP (in trillion yuan).
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5shadow banking sector and reduced liquidity. Within 
days China’s interbank lending rates rose to double dig-
its. Many desperate borrowers faced imminent default. 
This dire prospect forced Chinese policymakers to beat 
a hasty retreat. In December last year, the central bank 
tried again to send a message to the participants in the 
shadow banking sector by reducing liquidity. Again, in-
terest rates shot up, and the central bank had to abandon 
its tightening attempt.
 It appears that no task is more complex and delicate 
than guiding the Chinese financial system to a soft land-
ing. The Xi government has to balance three competing 
objectives in 2014. The first objective is to stabilize the fi-
nancial sector. The second objective is to maintain growth 
at a decent level (the new prime minister, Li Keqian, has 
said that 7 percent of GDP growth is needed to support 
employment). The third objective is implement struc-
tural reform. Obviously, these objectives are in conflict 
with each other. Maintaining financial sector stability 
will require reduction in credit growth, a step that will 
almost certainly dampen GDP growth. Forcing through 
some structural reforms (by raising the prices of natural 
resources, reducing subsidies to SOEs, and moving away 
from investment-led growth) will also likely hurt growth 
and even precipitate a financial crisis if zombie compa-
nies are pushed into bankruptcy. But if the Xi govern-
ment values growth above long-term financial stability 
and sustainability and keeps loan growth at 20 percent, 
they may hit their target of 7–7.5 percent for 2014 (so far 
Beijing has not announced an official target), but such a 
course will dim the prospects of structural reform and 
raise the frightening specter of a full-blown financial cri-
sis in the next four to five years.
Fighting a Two-Front Political War
For all the intractable economic challenges facing him, 
Xi has one advantage denied his predecessors: unrivaled 
personal authority since the passing of Deng Xiaoping 
capacity in most manufacturing industries (the average 
capacity utilization in steel, aluminum, copper, cement, 
and auto in China is about 70 percent). Private business-
es, mostly real estate developers and mining companies, 
have loaded up on debt since 2008 to ride the property 
and commodities boom. As a result, they have construct-
ed tens of millions of housing units that now sit empty or 
built unprofitable mines.
 To be sure, the massive injection of credit enabled Chi-
na to fund its fixed-asset investment (chiefly infrastruc-
ture) and maintain high growth during 2009–2013. But 
debt-fueled growth is not only risky but also ultimately 
unsustainable. Fitch Ratings, a credit rating agency, pro-
jected that, based on the experience of the last five years, 
China’s debt will be 280 of GDP in 2017 and annual inter-
est payment alone will exceed 20 percent of GDP. 
 Perhaps aware of the unsustainability of the trajecto-
ry of debt growth, the Chinese government, in particular 
the People’s Bank of China (the central bank), has begun 
to tighten credit and reduce liquidity. But their initial ef-
forts have produced no visible impact. While measures 
to curb loan growth through the (formal) banking sector 
are usually implemented more or less effectively (due to 
the strict loan quota system), borrowers can evade such 
curbs by tapping into the fast-growing shadow bank-
ing system – a network of trust companies, investment 
funds, credit brokers, and the bond market. Estimates 
place the size of the shadow banking sector, which was 
negligible before 2008, at roughly $5–6 trillion, or 30 
percent of the entire financial system. 
 Because there is significant leakage from the formal 
banking system into the shadow banking system (much 
of the credit created through the shadow banking sys-
tem is actually funded by deposits in state-owned banks), 
any attempt by Chinese monetary authorities to tighten 
credit will instantly freeze up the shadow banking sec-
tor, sending inter-bank lending rates through the roof. 
In June 2013, the central bank attempted to rein in the 
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wants to demonstrate to the CCP that he will not allow 
pro-democracy forces to undermine the party’s rule. Xi’s 
personal authority is contingent upon the party’s confi-
dence in his intentions and ability to defend its political 
monopoly. And such confidence can be maintained only if 
Xi continues to adhere to a conservative political strategy.
 However, this strategy has its pitfalls. Xi’s delicate 
balancing act – fighting corruption and tightening control 
simultaneously – is hard to maintain for an extended time. 
At the moment, Xi seems to be relying mostly on his per-
sonal authority and a top-down approach to fight corrup-
tion. His anti-graft campaign is marked by unprecedented 
intensity. However, intense campaigns are by nature un-
sustainable. They require the bureaucracy to do little else 
except carrying out the top leadership’s wishes. Inevita-
bly, such campaigns lose steam as top leadership has oth-
er priorities and the bureaucracy finds itself exhausted. 
Worse still, a sustained anti-corruption campaign could 
undermine leadership unity if it snares officials with close 
ties to senior leaders. If pursued with full commitment, 
a war on corruption will likely cause a paralysis in gov-
ernment activities. Corrupt activities are the proverbial 
grease that oils the machinery of the Chinese bureaucra-
cy. Much official business is conducted in secluded private 
dining rooms in high-end restaurants. Gifts and bribes 
are expected simply to set up meetings with officials, 
who normally have little incentive to grant approval to 
anyone if they themselves cannot benefit personally from 
exercising the power of their office. As a result, an ex-
tended campaign against corruption will probably under-
mine Xi’s most important power base – the party and the 
bureaucracy.
 At the same time, tightening political control can risk 
a societal backlash. Moderates in Chinese society who 
hoped that the Xi administration would pursue limited 
liberalization could become disillusioned and radical-
ized. Re-imposing ideological restrictions reminiscent of 
the Maoist era could alienate a society that has become 
17 years ago. Since he ascended to the top position in 
November 2012, Xi has quickly asserted his institutional 
power as the head of the CCP and the commander-in-
chief and largely broken the mode of collective leader-
ship that has governed China since the end of the Deng 
era. Since the end of the CCP plenum last November, Xi 
has acquired additional power. He has been appointed 
the chairman of the newly established National Security 
Committee and the head of the Central Leading Group on 
Economic Reform.
 Evidently, amassing power improves Xi’s chances of 
pushing through tough reforms. But so far, Xi has exer-
cised his personal authority in a way that has raised ques-
tions about the direction in which he is leading China.
 Judging by the most consequential actions Xi has 
taken since November 2012, he seems to be following the 
example of the late Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. On the 
one hand, Xi has launched the most sweeping and sus-
tained anti-corruption drive in recent memory. Dozens of 
senior officials have been arrested, and nearly 182,000 
party members were punished in 2013. On the other 
hand, his government has also engineered the harshest 
crackdown on dissent and free speech. Several civic ac-
tivists, including Mr. Xu Zhiyong, a well-known human 
rights lawyer, have been arrested and sentenced to jail 
terms. Outspoken academics were fired from universities. 
China’s social media, once a vibrant arena for airing com-
plaints against corruption and official misdeeds, has been 
tamed through an unrelenting campaign of censorship.
 On the surface, Xi’s political strategy of fighting a 
two-front war makes sense. By cracking down on corrup-
tion, Xi seeks to reassure the Chinese people that they 
can count on his personal authority to cleanse a govern-
ment that has come to be identified with privilege and 
crony capitalism. If his anti-corruption campaign suc-
ceeds, it can gain Xi popular support and improve gov-
ernance. By implication, such success will make genuine 
democratic reform unnecessary. At the same time, Xi also 
7has delivered desired results by then, he will have ac-
cumulated enough political capital to nominate his own 
successor, a privilege denied his two predecessors. 
 At the moment, Xi’s strategy faces two near-term 
challenges. Economically, his government must balance 
the competing goals of maintaining growth and achiev-
ing a soft landing of the over-leveraged financial system. 
Politically, he may have to stop waging a two-front war 
simultaneously. Confronting the economic challenge may 
be hard enough, but modifying his political strategy is 
even harder. The perception that he is the strongest lead-
er since Deng Xiaoping may, counter-intuitively, work 
against Xi’s long-term political interests. In a one-party 
state, political capital must be acquired and replenished 
continuously. Personal authority is often ephemeral. Po-
litical loyalty within the regime is practically non-exis-
tent. As someone who wants to emulate the late Deng, it 
is worth noting that Deng was a master coalition-builder 
and took care to cultivate major social groups for support. 
In the early days of his reform, he enlisted the intelligent-
sia in discrediting a moribund Maoist ideology, mobilized 
the peasantry in dismantling collective agriculture, and 
supported private entrepreneurs in reviving capitalism. 
The biggest missing piece in Xi’s reform agenda is the 
role of China’s dynamic and vibrant civil society. As the 
above analysis shows, Xi’s real – and dependable – po-
litical allies are the progressive forces in Chinese society, 
not the apparatchiks whose interests and survival are the 
ultimate victims of the reforms announced by Xi’s gov-
ernment – if such reforms ever succeed.
accustomed to expanding civic rights. A conservative 
political strategy also works against Xi’s declared goal 
of improving governance because greater press censor-
ship and political repression will stifle public opinion 
and make officials less accountable. In the worst case 
scenario, a majority of the public may lose hope in Xi as a 
true reformer. 
Concluding Thoughts
The Xi government has embarked on an ambitious but 
high-risk strategy full of internal contradictions. At the 
moment, there are no signs that Xi and his colleagues 
have recognized these contradictions, let alone adjust-
ed their policies to resolve them. At the heart of these 
contradictions is the conflict between the imperative to 
maintain the long-term survival of the CCP and the very 
reforms needed to revive Chinese economic growth and 
public confidence that are likely to endanger the party’s 
hold on power. More specifically, the economic reform 
strategy Xi has unveiled is crucial to rebalancing the 
Chinese economy and increasing its efficiency. To be 
successfully implemented, this strategy requires a sig-
nificant reduction of the power of the Chinese state and 
a dramatic empowerment of Chinese society. Clearly, 
this political outcome, a prerequisite of a market-based 
economy, could undermine the foundations of a one-par-
ty state. Tactically, the effective implementation of this 
strategy will require mobilization of societal forces to 
generate political pressure on interest groups currently 
embedded in the Chinese party-state. Apparently aware 
of the danger of appealing to the people for their sup-
port, Mr. Xi has so far opted for an entirely different 
course: centralizing power and relying on his personal 
authority to push reform.
 Thus, Xi’s long-term political prospects critically 
depend on his ability to manage the internal contradic-
tions of his strategy. He will face his greatest test in 
2017, when the CCP picks his successor. If Xi’s strategy 
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